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CONSTITUTIONAL FORMALISM AND THE MEANING OF
APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY

Benjamin J. Priester*
In June 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New
Jersey,' a case that likely will have a significant impact on the administration of
criminal justice in federal and state courts.2 The Court imposed a procedural
limitation on prosecutors by restricting the types of facts that may be proven at
sentencing rather than at trial. Specifically, the Court adopted a constitutional
principle that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum" is an element of the offense of conviction. 3 Under wellestablished constitutional doctrine, the Constitution's full procedural protections,
especially the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury at trial, apply
to elements of offenses. 4
Unless the Court intends to abrogate the long history of both legislative power to
determine the appropriate range of punishment for crimes and judicial discretion to
exercise judgment and consider additional facts in imposing a sentence within the
range established by statute, however, the Court must have a specific understanding, or more accurately a definition, of what constitutes a "fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum." The Court does
have such a definition, albeit one that is highly formalistic and strictly limited. For
that reason, the Court's definition, and the principle that depends upon it, is
* Associate, Ropes & Gray, Washington, D.C.; Law Clerk, Honorable Susan H. Black, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit (1999-2000); J.D., Duke University School of Law (December 1998). The views
expressed in this essay are my own. I would like to thank Steve Andrews, Sara Beale, Jeff Powell, Paul Rozelle,
and Rick Singer for comments and suggestions on this article.
1. 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
2. See Brooke A. Masters, High Court Ruling May Rewrite Sentencing, WASH. POST, July 23, 2000, at Al
(discussing impact of Apprendi decision and government reaction); see also David E. Rovella, A Looming
"Apprendi" Tsunami?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8, 2001, at Al.
3. 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. The Court's full statement of the principle, see infra note 39, includes a recidivism
exception, but the continuing vitality of that exception is highly questionable. See infra note 64.
4. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2355-56; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 232 (1999) (stating that "elements
must be... proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt"). The indictment issued by the grand jury also
must allege all elements of the offense. Jones, 526 U.S. at 232; Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
228-29 (1998) (same). The Apprendi decision did not directly discuss the issue of notice, however, because the
Court has not incorporated the Fifth Amendment's Indictment Clause as a constitutional requirement in state
cases. See 120 S. Ct. at 2355 n.3 (noting this aspect of case). Nevertheless, the Court has made clear that the
principle it adopted in Apprendi requires the covered facts to be alleged in federal indictments or state charging
instruments. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6 (stating in appeal from federal conviction that covered facts "must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt"); see alsoApprendi, 120 S.
Ct. at 2368-76 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing cases concerning sufficiency of allegations in charging
instrument as support for Apprendi principle).
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susceptible to a strong attack that it illogically and unnecessarily exalts form over
substance in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution and the Court's precedent. In Apprendi, both the dissent and the United States as amicus curiae launched
that attack - the dissent going so far as to call the Court's principle a "meaningless
formalism." 5
This Article considers the formalism of "any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" as it appears in the Apprendi
Court's principle and underlying definition. Part I briefly reviews the background
to the Apprendi decision and the underlying doctrines of constitutional criminal
procedure implicated by the Apprendi principle. Part II frames the issue in
Apprendi by discussing the majority's principle and definition and the dissent's
attack on them. Part III considers an example of an important statute - 21 U.S.C.
§ 841, the principal federal drug offense - on which the Apprendi principle has a
substantial impact, and concludes that the Apprendi principle, though formalistic,
is a necessary addition to the Court's doctrines of constitutional criminal procedure.
I.
A. FactualBackground

The debate over the precise issue in Apprendi is a recent development in the
Supreme Court. 6 In two 5-4 cases decided at the end of the 1997-98 Term, Justice
Scalia argued in dissent that each defendant's sentence was unconstitutional
because the sentence imposed, based on facts found at sentencing, exceeded the
maximum sentence prescribed in the offense of conviction." The following spring,
after a change in Justice Thomas's vote, 8 the Court ruled 5-4 in Jones v. United
States that the three-prong federal carjacking statute prescribed multiple offenses
rather than a single offense with intermediate sentencing gradations. 9 Rather than
expressly announce a constitutional rule requiring this outcome, however, the

5. 120 S. Ct. at 2389 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
6. See Benjamin J. Priester, Sentencedfor a "Crime " the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States
and the ConstitutionalLimitations on Factfindingby Sentencing FactorsRather Than Elements ofthe Offense, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 249-58 (1998) (discussing the evolution of related issues over the last thirty

years).
7. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that enhanced sentence was
unconstitutional because prior felony conviction used to justify it had not been proven as element of crime);
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 740-41 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that enhancement of
defendant's sentence by four years amounted to a conviction for a new crime). The majority opinions concluded
that the increased maximum sentences did not violate the Constitution. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247
(holding that recidivism-based sentencing increase did not trigger element requirements); Monge, 524 U.S. at 729

("[T]he sentencing determination here did not place petitioner in jeopardy for an 'offense."').
8. See Priester, supra note 6, at 296 nn.231-32 (suggesting reasons Justice Thomas may have changed his
vote).
9. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); infra note 60 (describing statute).
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Court relied upon canons of statutory construction applicable to ambiguous
statutes and upon the doctrine of constitutional doubt (which provides that a statute
of seriously dubious constitutionality will be construed to avoid the constitutional
concerns),10 The Court did state, in a footnote, that prior cases "suggest" the

Apprendi principle and its consequent constitutional doubt about the carjacking
statute;" yet a later footnote specifically disclaimed that the Court was adopting a
new constitutional rule.' 2
Subsequently, the lower federal courts often construed Jones narrowly, muting

its impact on many statutes.' 3 For example, courts concluded other statutes were
not ambiguous, like the carjacking statute had been, making the statutory construction principles irrelevant; courts also declined to accord the "suggest[ed]" footnoted principle much significance. 4 The Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Apprendi, a state case, reached the constitutional issue because the Court was forced

to confront it directly, rather than relying indirectly upon constitutional doubt.
Based on a finding of racially biased motive in committing the offense, made by a
preponderance of the evidence by the judge at sentencing, the defendant had been
sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment, exceeding the ten-year maximum

available for the offense of conviction. The Court adopted the Apprendi principle
and held that the defendant's sentence was unconstitutional. 15
B. DoctrinalBackground

A number of basic doctrines of constitutional criminal procedure interact in the
debate over the Apprendi principle. In many respects, a key difficulty with the
principle is the fact that each of these doctrines is so simple standing alone that it is
easy to think that the interaction between them must be equally simple. The reality
is more complicated. Adopting the Apprendi principle, or failing to adopt it, has

10. See id. at 232-52 (explaining why the statute defined multiple offenses).
11. Id. at243 n.6.
12. Id. at251 n.ll.
13. Compare, e.g., United States v. Hester, 199 F.3d 1287, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that facts
increasing maximum sentence must be interpreted as elements only if statute is ambiguous), vacated by 121 S. Ct.
336 (2000), overruled by United States v. Rogers, 228 F3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 2000), and United States v.
Castillo, 179 F.3d 321, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that type of firearm in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) was not
element of offense), rev'd, 530 U.S. 120 (2000), with United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600, 607-08 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 11 l(b) defines a separate offense from § 11 l(a)), United States v. Nunez, 180 F3d
227, 233 (5th Cir. 1999) (same), and United States v. Davis, 184 E3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Jones in
holding that great bodily injury was element of offense is state statute).
14. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., United States v. Hardin, 209 F.3d 652, 658
(7th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e are skeptical that the Court would announce such an important legal metamorphosis
halfway through a footnote halfway through an opinion that consists mostly of a fact-intensive analysis of a
specific statute and that in the end punts on whether Congress meant the provision in question to be a sentencing
factor or an element, but to play it safe treats the provision as an element.").
15. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2366-67 (2000).
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tremendous implications for criminal procedure, depending on the way these
doctrines are reconciled.
First, Apprendi implicates the doctrine that the legislature has plenary power to
define crimes and their constituent elements. 16 The examples are limitless: in most
jurisdictions, it is a crime to drive an automobile while intoxicated but not while
talking on a mobile phone, 17 some civil rights violations are subject to criminal
sanctions while others have only a civil remedy,t 8 and some states impose criminal
penalties for acts other states would not even think to regulate.' 9 There are, of
course, outer constitutional limits on legislative power, such as the requirements
that criminal statutes not be unconstitutionally vague20 and the Supreme Court's
recent limitations on the federal Commerce Clause power. 2 1 Nonetheless, in theory

and in practice, virtually every decision of
crime definition is a matter solely for
22
the legislature's discretion and judgment.
Second, it is accepted constitutional doctrine that the legislature also possesses

plenary authority to determine the sentences that may be imposed after conviction
for a criminal offense.23 This power includes the decision about which type of
sentencing scheme should exist - historically, whether each offense should carry a
determinate sentence or a sentencing range within which the sentencing judge
exercises discretion in selecting the appropriate sentence. 24 The power also
includes almost unlimited authority to determine the appropriate amount of

16. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604 (1994) ("[Tihe definition of the elements of a criminal
offense is entrusted to the legislature....") (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985)).
Particularly in the federal courts, where there are no common law crimes, the power of crime definition belongs
solely to Congress. See, e.g., Liparota,471 U.S. at 424 (citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32
(1812)).
17. But see Christine Haughney, Taking Phones Out of Drivers' Hands, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2000, at A8
(discussing state and local regulations of driving and cellular phones); Unsafe atAny Speed: Gadgets such as Cell
Phones, Mapping Systems Called Problemfor Drivers, DALL. MORNING NEWS, July 19, 2000, at A3 (same).
18. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (2000) (providing criminal sanctions for certain deprivations of
constitutional rights), with 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985, 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000) (providing civil remedies for
deprivations of constitutional and statutory civil rights).
19. See Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1293 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (invalidating state law criminalizing
commercial distribution of "sexual devices"), rev'd, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001).
20. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (describing standards of unconstitutional
vagueness).
21. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1752-53 (2000) (holding that Violence Against Women Act
exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (same for
Gun-Free School Zones Act).
22. But see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1 (limiting crime of treason); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 697-704 (1975) (invalidating state law that presumed all intentional murders were committed with malice
aforethought, where law defined grades of murder by presence or absence of malice aforethought); Priester, supra
note 6, at 263-65, 269-70, 283, 286-88, 289 (discussing other outer limits on legislative power).
23. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453,467 (1991) ("Congress has the power to define criminal
punishment without giving the courts any sentencing discretion."); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364
(1989) (holding that the courts' sentencing discretion is subject to legislature's control).
24. See Mistretta,488 U.S. at 364-65 (describing these two sentencing schemes).
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punishment to be inflicted upon an offender.2 5 For example, it is up to the
legislature whether crimes involving cocaine base ought to be punished much
more severely than those involving powder cocaine, 6 or the disclosure of
classified information more severely than mail fraud. 7 The Court to date has
imposed very few constitutional restraints on the legislature's decisions regarding

the severity of offenses and their corresponding punishments. 28
Third and finally, it is constitutional canon that the standards of criminal
procedure applicable at trial do not apply at sentencing. The requirements that
certain facts be alleged in the indictment, proven to the jury, and found beyond a

reasonable doubt apply only to elements of the offense. 29 Factfinding at sentencing
to determine the appropriate sentence that should be imposed on the offender for
his offense is governed by neither these stringent requirements30 nor the trial's
evidentiary restrictions to facts related to the charged offense.31 For most of the

history of federal criminal justice, offenses had either determinate sentences or a
range of available sentences from which the sentencing judge had unregulated
discretion to choose.3 2 In this era, a judge often sentenced an offender to the high
or low end of the available range based on aggravating or mitigating facts found at
33

sentencing, if the judge even based the selected sentence on specific facts at all.
After the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the creation of the federal
Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing became much more standardized.34 It remained

25. But see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (holding that death sentence may not be imposed for
felony murder lacking intent to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that death sentence may
not be imposed for rape).
26. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000) (prescribing sentences for distribution of powder and crack
crack ); United States v. Sanchez, 81 F.3d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting disparity in sentencing between powder
cocaine and crack cocaine).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2000) (ten-year maximum sentence for disclosure of classified information); id.
§ 1341 (five-year maximum sentence for mail fraud).
28. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (recognizing narrowly limited Eighth Amendment
proportionality requirement); but cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 738-52 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (suggesting Constitution may impose limits on punishment for crime of physician-assisted suicide);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (same for criminal sodomy).
29. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1998) (noting that requirements
applicable to elements of offenses do not apply to "factors relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found
guilty of the charged crime").
30. See id.
31. Compare, e.g., FED. R. Evt. 404(b) (excluding evidence of defendant's prior crimes, with limited
exceptions), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A 1.3(a) (providing for consideration of evidence at
sentencing "without regard to its admissibility under the Rules of Evidence at trial"), U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 6 (providing for calculation of "criminal history" score and category based on offender's
prior convictions), and U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Sentencing Table (providing, for example, that
offense level 20 be punished by 33-41 months' imprisonment for low criminal history category I and by 70-87
months for high criminal history category VI).
32. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2358 & n.9 (2000) (noting this tradition); id. at 2391-93
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same).
33. See Priester, supra note 6, at 251-52 & nn.9-10.
34. See generally U.S. SENTE.NCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2000).
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quite clear, however, that the Supreme Court would continue to recognize that
procedures for sentencing an offender already convicted of an offense are very
different from the procedures necessary to convict the offender in the first instance.
For example, the Court determined that the Guidelines did not violate the
35
Constitution by permitting the consideration at sentencing of uncharged conduct,
conduct for which the defendant was acquitted,36 or prior convictions in evaluating
the severity of a subsequent offense.3 7
Thus, the Court's doctrines of constitutional criminal procedure before Apprendi
recognized a sharp distinction between trials and sentencing proceedings. 38
Moreover, the doctrines acknowledged that the legislature has plenary power to
determine the applicable law on both sides of this distinction. The application of
these doctrines, however, caused the Court's deep division over the Apprendi
principle.
II.
In Apprendi, the Court split 5-4 in adopting as constitutional doctrine the
principle that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum" must be an element of the offense. The majority's argument
in favor of adopting the principle relied in large part upon a specific and narrow
definition of what it means to say that a fact increases the statutory maximum
sentence. The majority asserted that the limited scope of this definition protects the
constitutional interests at stake while placing only a modest limitation on legislative authority in promulgating crime and sentencing laws. The dissent, on the other
hand, attacked the majority's principle and definition as being so overly formalistic
as to be rendered meaningless. It is worth discussing these contrasting positions in
detail to understand the consequences of adopting, or refusing to adopt, the
Apprendi Court's principle that every fact that increases the statutory maximum
sentence is an element of the offense.
A. The Apprendi Principle,Its Underlying Definition,
and Its ConstitutionalJustification
The Apprendi principle states that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

35. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399-400 (1995) (holding that no double jeopardy violation
existed by later prosecution for previously uncharged conduct taken into account in sentencing for prior offense).
36. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997) (per, curiam) (holding that courts may consider
conduct for which defendant was acquitted in sentencing on other charges).
37. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992) (holding that double jeopardy not violated by considering prior

crime in calculating sentence for later offense); see also Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 724, 737 (1998)
(holding that double jeopardy not applicable to non-capital re-sentencing proceedings after appellate court
remand).
38. See also Priester, supra note 6, at 271-75 (arguing that distinction also is made in text of Constitution).
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beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" is an element of the offense.3 9

Alternatively stated, the principle requires proof under the procedures applicable
to elements of offenses for "the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed

range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. ' 40 Thus, the key to
understanding the principle is its definition of what constitutes the maximum
sentence "prescribed" by "statute."
The simplest formulation of the Apprendi principle defines the prescription of4a1
maximum sentence by reference to the statute cited as the offense of conviction.

That is, the principle precludes "the imposition of a sentence more severe than the
statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict.",42 The effect
of the principle therefore is only a procedural, rather than a substantive, restriction
on the extent of the sentence that may be imposed on a convicted offender.43 It

does not matter what the offense of conviction is, or what facts the jury did or did
not have to find to convict of that offense. Instead, to apply the principle, a court
need only look at the statute the defendant was convicted of violating and apply the
maximum sentence provided in it.
This simple statement of the Apprendi principle is of value, however, only when

applied to provisions in the criminal code that mention a single maximum
sentence 44 or to freestanding sentencing enhancement provisions that can be used
to enhance the sentences imposed for a broad range of offenses.45 For example, no
matter how reprehensible the offender or his conduct in bribing a public official,
his sentence for one count of that crime may not exceed fifteen years.4 6 Similarly,
the simple statement demonstrates why a "three-strikes" law must create a new
offense if it permits an enhanced sentence greater than that authorized by the
second or third strike alone. In California, an offender with one prior qualifying

39. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); cf id. at 2355 ("any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt") (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
40. Id. at 2363 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-253 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
41. See id. at 2354 ("The constitutional question, however, is whether the 12-year sentence imposed on count
18 was permissible, given that it was above the 10-year maximum for the offense charged in that count. The
finding is legally significant because it increased-indeed, it doubled-the maximum range within which the
judge could exercise his discretion .....
42. Id. at 2361 n.13.
43. See id. at 2354 ("The substantive basis for New Jersey's enhancement is thus not at issue; the adequacy of
New Jersey's procedure is."); id. at 2365 ("[Tihe relevant inquiry is one.., of effect--does the required finding
expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?").
44. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (bribery of public official); id. § 594 (voter intimidation); id. § 1342
(use of fictitious name in mail fraud); 21 U.S.C. § 863 (2000) (sale of drug paraphernalia).
45. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351 (2000) (statute imposed enhanced sentence if
offense was committed with racially biased purpose); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 724-25 (1998) (statute
imposed enhanced sentence if defendant had prior qualifying convictions).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
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felony conviction has the sentence for a second conviction doubled, and an
offender with two prior qualifying felony convictions is sentenced to twenty-five
years to life imprisonment upon a third conviction. 47 Thus, an offender whose
second offense alone carries a maximum of seven years imprisonment could
nevertheless be sentenced to up to fourteen years by applying the three-strikes
law. 48 Yet the only offense of conviction at the time of the second offense carries a
maximum of seven years. The Apprendi principle holds that nothing in excess of
seven years may be imposed for the second offense unless the offender was in fact
convicted of more than one offense at that time49 - for example, a separate
aggravating offense (e.g., the three-strikes enhancement separately proven as an
offense) or a second, consecutively imposed crime (i.e., multiple simultaneous
convictions). The result in Apprendi itself was an application of exactly this simple
statement of the principle. 50 The offense of conviction is controlling, and no
sentence may exceed its maximum unless there is more than one offense of
conviction to be considered in the same sentencing proceeding.
The simple statement alone is not workable, however, for analyzing the statutes
considered in several of the Supreme Court's recent cases - statutes that contain
internal gradations of sentencing. For example, a statute may provide that a crime
is punished by up to two years' imprisonment, unless the offender is a recidivist, in
which case up to twenty years may be imposed; 5 a crime of violence might be
punished by up to fifteen years if no one is injured, but up to twenty-five years if2
serious bodily injury was caused, or up to life imprisonment if a death resulted;5
or a firearms offense may be punished by a sentence of five years, but by a sentence
of thirty years if the firearm involved was a machine gun.53 For such statutes, it is
not inherently obvious from the face of the provisions whether they state a single
offense with a single maximum or multiple offenses with different maxima.

47. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 724-25 (discussing CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1998)).

48. See id. at 739-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("for federal constitutional purposes, those extra... years are
attributable to conviction of a new crime").
50. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2351 (stating that offense of conviction carried five- to ten-year sentence, but
enhanced hate crime sentence range was 10-20 years). New Jersey's enhancement for race-based hate offenses is
available for all crimes; when applied to a second-degree offense like possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose, the practical effect is that the sentencing range for first-degree offenses is applied instead of the range for
second-degree offenses. See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae In
Support of Petitioner at 4-7, Apprendi (No. 99-478) (citing and discussing N.J. CODE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
§§ 2C39-4, 2C44-3e, 2C43-7, 2C43-6); but cf Brief for Anti-Defamation League as Amicus Curiae In Suppoit of
Respondent at 8-11, Apprendi (arguing that New Jersey statutory scheme should be interpreted as defining
maximum sentence as 20 years); cf infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text (explaining refined statement of
Apprendi principle, which would lead to same outcome even under ADL's argument).
51. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 229 (1998) (discussing illegal reentry by a deported
alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1326).
52. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230 (1999) (considering carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119).
53. See Castillo v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2090, 2093 (2000) (discussing use of firearm during crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988 Supp. V)).
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The refined statement of the Apprendi principle resolves this issue of interpretation by drawing a distinction between two types of provisions. Offense-defining
provisions prescribe the elements of crimes, setting out those facts that must be
proven at trial; sentencing-regulating provisions regulate the discretion of sentencing judges, often by tying requirements for specific sentences to findings of fact
made only at the sentencing stage. The same statute may include more than one
offense-defining provision to define more than one offense; 54 each offense would
have its own elements and maximum sentence. 55 By contrast, a statute also may
create a subsidiary sentencing range within the maximum for a separately defined
offense to create a sentencing-regulating provision for the offense-defining provision - but any provision that extends the maximum sentence for a separately
defined offense creates an additional, aggravated offense.5 6 Offense-defining
provisions create sentencing entitlements by which sentencing-regulating provisions must abide: the prosecution is entitled to seek, and the defendant is entitled to
receive, a sentence no greater than the maximum stated in the provision of the
offense-defining statute under which the defendant was convicted. 57 "When a
judge's finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence authorizes an
increase in the maximum punishment, it is appropriately characterized as 'a tail
which wags the dog of the substantive offense.' ' 58 Thus, if a provision increases
the maximum sentence available for an offense, then the provision is itself
offense-defining and the facts necessary to invoke it are elements of an aggravated
offense and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.
The refined statement of the Apprendi principle then applies this distinction by
adopting the rule that a multi-part criminal statute that is offense-defining in part
will be interpreted to be offense-defining with respect to all its constituent parts
absent a clear or plain statement by the legislature that the statute is not only
partially offense-defining but also partially sentencing-regulating. To enact a plain
statement that satisfies this requirement, the provision must include not only a
single, plainly stated maximum sentence for a single offense, but also must clearly
state that the gradations listed are sentencing regulations only. If it is not precisely
stated that subsidiary gradations are merely sentencing regulations within the
54. Cf Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2359 ("[i]f a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when
an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others," then those circumstances are elements of the

offense).
facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and
55. Cf id. at 2359 ("the requirements of trying to a jury all
proving those facts beyond reasonable doubt").
56. See id. at 2365 n.19 (distinguishing between "sentencing factors" within the maximum and "sentence
enhancements" that extend the maximum sentence).
57. See id. at 2378-79 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Thus, it is one thing to consider what the Constitution
requires the prosecution to do in order to entitle itself to a particular kind, degree, or range of punishment of the
accused and quite another to consider what constitutional constraints apply either to the imposition of punishment
within the limits of that entitlement or to a legislature's ability to set broad ranges of punishment.") (citation
omitted); Transcript of Oral Argument at 39-42, 49-51, Apprendi (No. 99-478).
58. Id. at 2365 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
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offense's single overall maximum, then the Apprendi principle irrebuttably presumes that the legislature intended to define multiple offenses within one statutory
provision.59 (Alternatively, it could be said that the presumption in favor of
multiple-offense-definition for multi-part statutes is rebuttable, but only by a
qualifying, internal plain statement - not by statutory construction, legislative
history, or any other source external to the statute's text.) The applications of the
Apprendi principle in the Supreme Court to multi-part statutes have followed this

rule. 60 Thus, statutes that define offenses are only offense-defining unless the
legislature specifically states otherwise in the text of the statute.
This plain-statement rule in the Apprendi principle has important consequences
for the way offenders are sentenced. Primarily, the principle declares that the most
important decision a court must make is to determine the maximum sentence
provided by the offense of conviction, as established by the simple or refined
statement of the Apprendi principle. Any sentencing regulations the court applies whether from independent non-statutory guidelines, separate sentencing-regulating statutes, or specifically designated sentencing regulations within an otherwise
offense-defining statute - when calculating punishment do not raise constitutional
obstacles under the principle so long as the court ultimately imposes a sentence no
greater than the already-determined prescribed statutory maximum. 6 ' The application of the federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example, raises no concerns under
the Apprendi principle because the Guidelines are not offense-defining statutes and
no Guidelines sentence can ever exceed a statutory maximum.6 2 Although there is

59. Cf Richard G. Singer & Mark D. Knoll, Searching for the "Tail of the Dog": Finding "Elements" of
Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1057, 1084-1102 (1999) (criticizing
recent decisions construing statutory facts as sentencing factors rather than elements of offenses).
60. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6, 251-52 (1999) (construing federal statute as creating
multiple offenses under doctrine of constitutional doubt); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
270-72 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same); see also Carter v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (2000)
(relying in part on Jones in holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (b) created two offenses); Castillo v. United States,
120 S. Ct. 2090, 2092 (2000) (noting that Court considered statute to state aggravated offense rather than
sentencing factors "even apart from" constitutional doubt analysis of Jones); cf United States v. Ubakanma, 215
E3d 421 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying Jones to hold that final sentence in text of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, imposing greater
punishment for wire fraud against financial institution, created aggravated offense).
61. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2378 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("establishing what punishment is available by
law and setting a specific punishment within the bounds that the law has prescribed are two different things"); cf
id. at 2365-66 (noting that placement of provision in sentencing section of state code was irrelevant because
maximum sentence was increased by provision).
62. See id. at 2366 n.21; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Gl.l; see also, e.g., United States v.
Hemandez-Guardado, 228 E3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Meshack, 225 F3d 556, 576-77 (5th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Cepero, 224 E3d 256, 267 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that applying Sentencing
Guidelines cannot increase penalty for a crime beyond statutory maximum); compare United States v. McGuire,
200 F.3d 668, 671-73 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that holding of Jones applied to proof of serious bodily injury only
to impose enhanced maximum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2), not to provision of Sentencing Guidelines
applied to increase Guidelines range, but not maximum sentence, under § 2119(1)), with Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at
2380 n.ll (Thomas, J., concurring) (leaving open question whether Apprendi principle applies to Sentencing
Guidelines).
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good reason to think the Apprendi rule ultimately may be applied to a prescribed
statutory minimum sentence as well as the maximum sentence, the limitation of
the rule to offense-defining statutes would remain. 63 It also appears likely the
Apprendi principle has no subject-matter exceptions. 64 Thus, the Apprendi principle creates a sharp distinction between offense-defining and sentence-regulating
provisions within an
statutes and adopts a plain statement rule that multiple
65
offense.
separate
a
define
each
statute
offense-defining

63. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that the fact needed to impose a mandatory minimum sentence
was not an element of the offense. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). The Pennsylvania provision was not part of the
offense-defining provision under which the defendant had been convicted; rather, it was a separately enacted and
designated sentencing provision. See id. at 81-82 & n. 1. To the extent the Apprendi principle requires provisions
of offense-defining statutes, but not provisions of sentencing-regulating statutes, to be elements of offenses, the
Pennsylvania statute (like the non-statutory federal Sentencing Guidelines) would appear to be in the latter
category, making Apprendi consistent with the result in McMillan. But many mandatory minimum sentences
appear in offense-defining statutes governed by the Apprendi principle. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000)
(setting mandatory minimum); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(I)(A)-(B) (2000) (same). There is no sound reason not to apply
the Apprendi principle to the maximum and minimum sentences required by the offense-defining statute. See
Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2379-80 (Thomas, J., concurring); Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (Stevens, J., concurring); cf.
id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing principle as applying to punishment "range"); but see also Apprendi,
120 S.Ct. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority opinion amounts to "overruling McMillan").
After all, if the legislature required a determinate sentence in the offense-defining provision, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) (1988 Supp. V) (construed in Castillo v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2090, 2093 (2000)), the sentencing
court obviously could deviate neither above nor below that sentence. Similarly, the sentencing court could not
deviate below a minimum sentence in an offense-defining statute any more than it could deviate above a
maximum sentence in the same statute. Thus, the Apprendi principle ought to apply to both minimum and
maximum sentences prescribed in offense-defining statutes-requiring proof as an element of the offense for a
fact that alters the available sentence for a crime from 5 to 10 years to, for example, 7 to 10 years, 5 to 15 years, or
7 to 15 years. Cf United States v. Hardin, 209 F.3d 652, 659 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that drug kingpin provision
in continuing criminal enterprise offense, 21 U.S.C. § 848, which altered available sentence from 20 years to life
in § 848(a) to mandatory life sentence under § 848(b), did not create additional elements of offense under Jones
because it only imposed additional mandatory minimum without increasing maximum sentence); United States v.
Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2000) (same after Apprendi); cf also United States v. Carlson, 217 F.3d 986
(8th Cir. 2000) (holding that 7-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) for
brandishing firearm was not separate offense under Jones and Apprendi from 5-year mandatory minimum
available under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) without brandishing, despite fact that 7 years for § 924 were imposed
consecutively to underlying crime of violence).
64. In Apprendi and Jones, the Court included an exception for recidivism, excepting the fact of a prior
conviction from the Apprendi principle. See supra note 39. The Court apparently did so to avoid having to
overrule the holdings of Almendarez-Torres and Monge. Nevertheless, it is clear the Justices forming the 5-4
majority in Apprendi view those two 5-4 cases as wrongly decided: the four previously dissenting Justices are
now joined by Justice Thomas, who had cast the swing vote against applying the Apprendi principle in those cases
but who wrote separately in Apprendi to explain his switch. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2361-62, 2366; id. at 2379
(Thomas, J., concurring). Thus, although presently still good law, it seems likely Almendarez-Torres and Monge
soon will be overruled.
65. This interpretation of the Apprendi principle is consistent with the manner in which federal courts
historically interpreted federal criminal statutes. See Singer & Knoll, supra note 59, at 1062-81 (discussing
common law rule and its application, principally to quantity and value determinations in Prohibition and larceny
cases). Courts uniformly interpreted as elemefits of an offense facts appearing in the statute that were tied to the
sentence, see id.; see also id. at 1085, 1087, but other facts considered by the judge in imposing sentence within
the statutory range were not elements. See id. at 1066 & n.45, 1068 & n.54, 1069 n.55. In these cases, however, the
statutory facts either were gradations within an offense-defining section (which, like Jones or Almendarez-Torres,
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The Apprendi Court provided a constitutional justification for adopting its
principle. The Court briefly noted the requirement of procedural due process of
law in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 66 as well as the requirement that the
defendant have fair notice of the offense with which he is charged, including notice
of the maximum possible sentence for the offense.6 7 More significantly, the Court
emphasized the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial - that is, the right to a jury
determination, under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, of all
elements of the offense.68 The Court argued that the right to a jury trial historically
has been understood to include the Apprendi principle that the sentence imposed
after conviction may not exceed that stated in the offense of conviction.69
Particularly important is the long-accepted rule that a sentencing judge's discretion
to impose a sentence always has been limited by the maximum provided in the
statutory offense of conviction pronounced by the jury.7 ° Justice Thomas's lengthy

concurring opinion elaborated further on the history of the common law right to a
jury trial to demonstrate that the common law principles underlying the original
understanding of the Sixth Amendment included at least the Apprendi principle.71
The Apprendi majority therefore concluded that the Apprendi principle was
necessary to protect the fundamental constitutional right to a jury trial from being
undermined by increasingly complex modem offense-defining and sentenceregulating statutes.
B. The Attack on, and the Alternative to, the Apprendi Principle

The attack on the Apprendi principle is grounded in the argument that the
Constitution contains no requirement limiting the sentence imposed after a
conviction to any maximum stated in the statutory offense of conviction. The
alternative view is that "[o]nce a defendant has been found guilty of a crime, after
being afforded his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the Constitution does not
prevent the State from entrusting to the sentencing process the determination of

must be construed as separate offenses) or were facts that authorized an increase in the maximum sentence faced
by the defendant (which accordingly mandates that they are offense-defining rather than sentencing-regulating
facts). The concept of a sentencing-regulating statute is a recent development not contemplated by these cases.
See id. at 1084 n.130; see also id. at 1058, 1082-84. But if sentencing fact-finding in the exercise of judicial
discretion has always been constitutional, there is no tenable reason the legislature may not further regulate
sentencing discretion (short of enacting only determinate sentences) by sentencing-regulatingstatutes. Compare
supra note 63, and, e.g., Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2399-2401 (Breyer, J., dissenting), with Singer & Knoll, supra
note 59, at 1112 n.260 ("McMillan must be limited or overruled"), andApprendi,120 S. Ct. at 2380 n.1 I (Thomas,

J., concurring) ("the Guidelines have the force and effect of laws") (quotation omitted).
66. See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2355-56.
67. See id. at 2356 ("The defendant's ability to predict with certainty the judgment from the face of the felony
indictment flowed from the invariable linkage of punishment with crime.").
68. See id. at 2356.
69. See id. at 2356-58.
70. See id. at 2358-60.

71. See id. at 2368-78 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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facts that may enhance the range of appropriate punishment. ' 72 Provisions that
permit a sentence to be imposed greater than that for the offense of conviction are
evaluated on a case-by-case basis for fundamental fairness, but, contrary to the

Apprendi principle, the fact that the maximum sentence is enhanced, even well
beyond that otherwise stated in the offense of conviction, is not alone enough to
create a constitutional violation.7" The alternative view emphasizes that the
case-by-case approach is appropriate because the legislature has plenary authority
to define elements of, and appropriate punishments for, offenses. 74 Moreover,
recent decisions had rejected the argument that the Apprendi principle was
constitutionally required, 7 5 and had determined that a bright-line rule was foreclosed by earlier precedent.7 6

Thus, under the alternative view, the offense of conviction is irrelevant to the
sentence that may be imposed on an offender. So long as some law authorizes the
sentence imposed (e.g., a three-strikes provision77 ), there is no constitutional
difficulty even if the ultimate sentence is beyond that stated in the offense of
conviction. 78 The United States, arguing as amicus curiae in Apprendi, asserted
that "the Constitution permits the sentencing court to take account of any relevant
information it has available concerning the defendant's conduct or character, and
to impose any sentence authorized by law.",79 "[A] defendant [has been] punished
only for an offense of which he has been convicted[,] no matter what other conduct
or character factors [have been] taken into account in setting a sentence within the
range authorized for that offense," 80 even if the range so authorized did not come

from the offense of conviction. Thus, on the facts.of Apprendi, despite the fact that
the offense of conviction (possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose)
provided a maximum sentence of ten years, the United States and the Apprendi

72. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Apprendi (No. 99-478).
73. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2395-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (applying such analysis); see also Priester,
supra note 6, at 263-66, 283 (discussing this "factors analysis" method).
74. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2380-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 2386-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224
(1998), and Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998)).
. 76. See id. at 2386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), and
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)).
77. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 729 (1998); see id. at 739-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
even 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) would not have to be interpreted as creating separate offenses, although it always has
been thought to do so).
78. Cf.Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2367 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing this consequence). The alternative view
presumably assumes such a sentence-authorizing law is otherwise constitutional-that is, does not violate
principles of notice, proportionality, or equal protection, for example. But under the alternative view, the effect on
the sentence relative to the provisions of the offense of conviction is not alone a constitutional difficulty.
79. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 30, Apprendi (No. 99-478).
80. Id. at 29.
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dissenters argued that the twelve-year sentence imposed on the defendant (pursuant to the hate-crime enhancement at sentencing) did not violate the Constitution. 8'
The alternative view rejects the argument that there is any constitutional
significance to the maximum sentence listed in the offense of conviction. Rather,
once the offender has been convicted of some offense, the appropriate sentence
may be determined by reference to other laws and provisions designed to achieve
the most just punishment in the given case. "When a State takes a fact that has
always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment, and dictates
the precise weight that a court should give that fact in setting a defendant's
sentence, the relevant fact need not be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
as would an element of the offense., 8 2 The alternative view also rejects any
distinction between forms of sentencing schemes, such as judicial discretion,
non-statutory guidelines, statutory sentencing controls, or determinate sentences.
"A sentencing system in which judges have discretion to find sentencing-related
factors is a workable system and one that has long been thought consistent with the
Constitution; why, then, would the Constitution treat sentencing statutes any
differently?, 83 Although the charged offense limits the scope of the trial, once the
government has obtained a conviction, the particular offense tried does not limit
the sentence that may be imposed.
The constitutional justification for the attack on the Apprendi principle and its
alternative view proceed from both an independent constitutional analysis and a
critique of the constitutional analysis of the Apprendi majority. The emphasis of
the independent constitutional analysis is on the need to accord the legislature
substantial deference in determining which facts should be included in the
definitions of criminal offenses, which facts are relevant only to sentencing, and
the significant differences that may arise between the two determinations.8 4 The
alternative view concludes that the legislature ought not be made to choose
between determinate sentencing and unbridled discretion for sentencing judges,
and accordingly must be given the power to impose sentencing-level gradations
without defining new offenses. 8 5 Moreover, because there never has been any
question as to the constitutionality of the long history of discretionary sentencing
by judges even when tied to facts found by the judge at sentencing, the legislature
must be able to regulate judicial sentencing factfinding: "[I]t is difficult to see why

81. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. 2395-96 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see generally Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Apprendi (No. 99-478).
82. Id. at 2386 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. at 2399 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
84. See id. at 2397-2401 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 13-16, Apprendi (No. 99-478).
85. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 19, Apprendi (No. 99-478) ("It is
not reasonable to hold that the Constitution requires legislatures to expose all offenders to the same maximum
penalty, to be imposed or not at the discretion of the sentencing judge, rather than specifying for the judge which
classes of offenders who commit a particular crime may receive the harshest treatment.").
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a sentence that is constitutionally permissible if selected by a judge exercising
unlimited discretion becomes constitutionally impermissible because the judge
was permitted to select it only after making a statutorily specified threshold
finding."8 6
The critique of the constitutional analysis supporting the Apprendi principle
challenges the conclusion that the Apprendi principle is required by the Constitution. First, the attack asserts that the Apprendi principle has no basis in the
Constitution's provisions or the nation's constitutional history. 87 The attack also
rejects Justice Thomas's originalism argument,8 8 the majority's interpretation of
the Court's previous decisions, 8 9 and the argument that the alternative view
violates the right to a jury trial: "[a] legislature's provision for increased maximum
terms of punishment based on judicial findings does not erode or depreciate the
jury's function." 90
The attack also argues that the Apprendi principle itself is unjustifiable as a
constitutional principle because it is overly formalistic in such a manner that it in
fact serves no constitutional values. 9 1 Most prominent is the reliance on the fact
that the Apprendi principle can be avoided simply by drafting criminal statutes to
set a high maximum sentence in the offense-definition provisions and reserving the
sentencing regulations within that maximum for guidelines or a clearly delineated
sentencing provision.9 2 The dissenters noted that under the majority's principle,
"[tihe only [flaw in the New Jersey scheme] is that New Jersey has not prescribed
the 20-year maximum penalty in the same statute that it defines the crime to be
punished. It is difficult to understand... why the Constitution would require a
state legislature to follow such a meaningless and formalistic difference in drafting
its criminal statutes.",93 If, under the Apprendi principle "New Jersey can, consistent with the Constitution, make precisely the same differences in punishment turn

86. Id. at 18; see also id. at 16-18 ("There is, moreover, no evident reason to hold that statutes embodying such
judgments [concerning which facts are relevant at sentencing that are not relevant at trial] are constitutionally
different from statutes that define an offense and then specify only the maximum penalty that the legislature
believes appropriate for the worst offenses and offenders, while allowing judges plenary discretion within that
range .... The result should not be different where... the legislature imposes explicit statutory constraints on the
discretion otherwise accorded sentencing courts."); Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2392-93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id.
at 2399-2401 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2380-83, 2388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 2382-83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 2384-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 19-24, Apprendi (No. 99-478). The dissent also rejects the distinction between mitigation and
aggravation. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing distinction as formalistic and "in
the eye of the beholder").
90. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8, Apprendi (No. 99-478).
91. See id. at 13 (arguing that constitutional rule should not "turn on formalities of legislative drafting");
Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2389 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing Apprendi principle as "a meaningless
formalism").
92. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2389 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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on precisely the same facts" simply by placing a properly worded maximum
sentence in the offense-defining provision, then .'no constitutional values are
served by so formalistic an approach, while its constitutional costs in statutes
94
struck down... are real.'
Similarly, the attack notes that the formalistic Apprendi principle ignores the
functional equivalence of statutes that comply with its rule and statutes that violate
its rule. For example, the United States made the argument:
The situation of a defendant exposed to an enhanced maximum sentence based
on a statutory sentencing factor is functionally identical to the situation of a
defendant exposed to a particular sentence based on factors that a court must
find, under binding [non-statutory] sentencing guidelines, within the same
overall statutory range. The situation also resembles a scheme involving the
same overall range and traditional discretionary sentencing carried out by the
judge alone. The jury's finding of guilt in all of these regimes "open[s] the
door" to a long prison sentence, up to and including life imprisonment, based
on facts found at sentencing; but the jury finding that authorizes such
95
sentencing cannot be described in any of them as "low-level gatekeeping."
Similarly, the source of the maximum sentence - statute or sentencing guideline,
for example - matters little to the defendant. 96 Likewise, if the animating concern
is the right to jury trial and long sentences for conduct not proven to the jury, the
Apprendi principle would not preclude functionally equivalent threats such as
multiple counts of lesser charges being sentenced consecutively to achieve a long
sentence.97 Thus, unless the majority is prepared to hold that the Constitution
requires a much broader rule encompassing all facts tied to sentencing gradations,
whatever their source (e.g., the Sentencing Guidelines), its rule accomplishes little
- and, needless to say, the opponents of the Apprendi principle strenuously oppose
any such rule as inconsistent with both the long recognition of discretionary
judicial sentencing and the desirability of contemporary sentencing reform. 98
IH.
Both the Apprendi principle and the alternative view advanced by the principle's
critics present strong arguments. The Apprendi principle enforces the importance
of the offense of conviction and reinforces it by requiring sharp distinctions
between offense-defining and sentencing-regulating statutory provisions. The
94. Id. at 2391 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 267 (1999) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting)).

95. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27, Apprendi (No. 99-478)
(quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 244).
96. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2401 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. See id. at 2400-01 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 2391-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2398-2400, 2402 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 22, Apprendi (No. 99-478).

20011

CONSTITUTIONAL FORMALISM AND THE MEANING OF APPRENDI

alternative view emphasizes the legislature's power to define offenses and determine sentences and rejects the Apprendi principle as a formalistic distinction with
no practical or functional significance. A critical analysis demonstrates that the
Apprendi principle provides the better constitutional interpretation and better
adapts the doctrines of constitutional criminal procedure to the complexities of

modem statutory sentencing regulation.99
A. Keeping Up With the "Jones-es": Examining 21 U.S.C. § 841
As noted above, the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. United States,'0° the

case of Nathaniel Jones, a carjacker in the Ninth Circuit, marked the first time a
majority of the Court, albeit in a footnote, accepted the Apprendi principle as a
doctrine of constitutional criminal procedure. In Apprendi, the Court adopted the
principle as a constitutional requirement. Several days after Apprendi was decided,
the Court took further action on the Apprendi principle in a disposition that, despite

its obvious significance, received little contemporary attention in the media.
Carless Jones, a drug dealer in the Tenth Circuit, had been convicted of distributing, and possessing with intent to distribute, cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841, the principal federal drug offense.'" 1 The appellate court had considered the
Supreme Court's [Nathaniel]Jones decision, but determined that it did not require
the conclusion that the amount of cocaine base attributed to Carless 0 2 Jones was
an element of the section 841 offense, despite the increase in the maximum
sentence caused by the amount attributed.'1 3 The Supreme Court granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari in [Carless] Jones and ordered the following:

"Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for4
the Tenth Circuit for further consideration in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey."''0
The Supreme Court thereby signaled its willingness to disrupt considerably the
federal criminal justice system in service of the Apprendi principle.10 5 Section 841

99. The majority and dissent in Apprendi also dispute whether the restrictions on capital sentencing
proceedings imposed in the Court's death penalty cases undermine the validity of the Apprendi principle.
Compare 120 S. Ct. at 2366, id. at 2380 (Thomas, J., concurring), and Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-29, 34,
Apprendi (No. 99-478), with 120 S. Ct. at 2388-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Perhaps the best way to resolve this
dispute is to concede that the Apprendi principle is, just like many other ordinary rules otherwise applicable,
superseded by the Court's specialized procedural jurisprudence for capital cases-after all, "death is different."
See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 21 n.9 (1989) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,411 (1986)).
100. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
101. See United States v. Jones, 194 F.3d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 1999).
102. What puns the courts might have spun if only the cocaine distributor had been "Nathaniel" and the
carjacker "Carless!"
103. Jones, 194 F.3dat 1185-86.
104. Jones v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2739, 2739 (2000), vacatingand remandingUnited States v. Jones, 194
F3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999), on remand, 235 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2000).
105. Cf.Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2394-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2402 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Apprendi decision will be disruptive to criminal justice system and drug statutes in particular); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, Apprendi (No. 99-478) ("Because various federal
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therefore provides a good basis for examining the Apprendi principle and its
attackers' alternative view.
The statutory text of section 841 creates the necessity for interpretation. The
section begins with the following:
(a) Unlawful acts
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
or intentionally (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or 0dispense,
or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a
6
counterfeit substance.'
These provisions describe the prohibited acts and necessary mental state for the
offense. Notably, however, section 841(a) standing alone does not establish any
penalty, including a maximum or minimum sentence, for those who violate it.
Rather, the sentencing provisions appear in the next subsection:
(b) Penalties
Except as otherwise provided in [21 U.S.C. §§ 859-861), any person who violates
subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced as follows:
Subsection (b) then spans literally pages of the U.S. Code, providing a detailed
sentencing scheme for the subsection (a) drug offenses. The sentencing scheme
encompasses a variety of provisions: sentencing maxima, often based on the type
and quantity of drug involved in the offense,10 7 and sometimes accompanied by
mandatory minimum sentences;10 8 enhanced maxima when serious bodily injury
or death resulted from the offense,10 9 or if the offender has prior felony drug
convictions;ll 0 limitations on supervised release and ineligibility for parole; 1 ' and
even a mitigating provision for "distributing a small amount of marihuana for no
remuneration."' 12 Aside from any constitutional issues or canons of construction,
the text of section 841 does not unambiguously define only one offense with
sentencing regulations or multiple offenses based on drug amounts.
Before [Nathaniel]Jones and Apprendi, however, the interpretation of section
841 was settled. The courts of appeals were uniformly of the view that section
841(b) did not create any additional elements to the offense defined in section

criminal laws authorize the imposition of enhanced sentences on the basis of facts found by the court at
sentencing, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (drug type and quantity), the United States has a strong interest in the
outcome of this case.").
106. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000).
107. See, e.g., id. § 841(b)(1)(C) & (D), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7).
108. See, e.g., id. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (B).
109. See, e.g., id. § 841(b)(l)(A) & (B).
110. See, e.g., id. § 841(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), & (D), (b)(2), (b)(3).
111. See, e.g., id. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (B).
112. Id. § 841(b)(4).
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841 (a). 1 13 That is, although some amount of some drug was an element of the
offense - requiring an allegation in the indictment, and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury - the precise type and amount of drugs, and other related facts such
as serious bodily injury or death, that would be attributed to the offender for
purposes of calculating the sentence imposed under subsection (b) was a matter
that was reserved only to the sentencing hearing."1 4 Thus, the judge (by a
preponderance of the evidence at sentencing), not the jury (beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial), would find the facts necessary to determine whether the offender
had distributed forty-five or fifty-five grams of cocaine base, and therefore would
1 15
be sentenced to from five to forty years or from ten years to life, respectively.
After [Nathaniel] Jones, the appellate courts consistently refused to apply the
footnoted Apprendi principle to section 841. The courts reasoned either that the
text of section 841 was sufficiently clear in reserving drug type and amount for

sentencing that the Jones statutory construction and constitutional doubt arguments did not apply, 16 or that they simply would not overturn a long-settled
statutory construction on the basis of a constitutional principle only suggested in
footnotes by the Supreme Court.117 Although it would have been possible to do

otherwise, it is difficult to fault the courts of appeals for not taking the radical step
required by the Apprendi principle without more explicit guidance from the
Supreme Court. After the Apprendi decision and the [Carless] Jones remand,
however, it seems the appellate courts have little choice but to apply the Apprendi

principle to hold that, to the extent section 841(b) alters offenders' maximum
sentences based on factual findings, it creates separate offenses. 1 " The Court has

113. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 149 F.3d 760, 762 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Reyes, 40 F.3d 1148,
1150-51 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Perez, 960 F.2d 1569, 1574-76 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Patrick, 959 F.2d 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1992). For an insightful analysis of the process by which the courts arrived at
this interpretation, see Richard G. Singer, The Model Penal Code and Two (Possibly Only One) Ways Courts
Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 139, 146-57 (2000) (arguing that process produced erroneous
interpretation of section 841 even prior to Jones and Apprendi).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Hester, 199 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 336 (2000);
United States v. Jones, 194 F.3d 1178, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 1999), vacated, 120 S. Ct. 2739 (2000); Reyes, 40 F.3d at
1150-51.
115. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii) (2000).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 207 F3d 910, 920-21 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 376 (2000),
reinstated,236 E3d 886 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Swiney, 203 F.3d 397,404 n.5 (6th Cir. 2000); Hester,
199 F3d at 1291-92; Jones, 194 F.3d at 1185-86.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 204 F.3d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 2000) (refusing to accord footnote 6 in
[Nathaniel] Jones any constitutional significance); [Carless]Jones, 194 F.3d at 1186 (same); United States v.
Williams, 194 F.3d 100, 105-107 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same); see also, e.g., United States v. Grimaldo, 214 F.3d 967,
972-75 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant could not show plain error in light of language in [Nathaniel]
Jones); United States v. Taylor, 210 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318 (1lth Cir. 2000); United States v. Nordby, 225 E3d 1053
(9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rebmann, 226 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 841(b) provisions are
elements of offense under Apprendi); see also United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 931-34 (8th Cir.
2000) (noting effect of Apprendi but finding no error because provision applied was mandatory minimum, not
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and the

United States has chosen not to contest the application of Apprendi to section
841. t2 °

The consequence of applying the Apprendi principle to section 841 starkly
highlights the differences between the principle and the alternative view. Under the
Apprendi principle, section 841, as presently written, creates multiple offenses.
Most importantly, section 841(a), while including most of the operative offensedefining language, does not include a maximum sentence. The only maxima found
are located in section 841(b). There are many more than one listed; therefore,
under the refined statement of the Apprendi principle, these varying maxima each
define a separate offense. Although section 841(b) is labeled "Penalties," this is far
from plain enough to designate the gradations as sentencing-regulating rather than
offense-defining - particularly in light of the failure of the offense-defining
provisions of section 841(a) to include any sentences at all, much less a single
maximum sentence. Thus, under the Apprendi principle, section 841 defines
multiple offenses, and the maximum-altering distinctions within section 841 (b) are
elements of the various offenses.
The alternative view of the critics of the Apprendi principle would preserve the
pre-Apprendi interpretation of section 841. Although it is true that section 841(a)
does not state a maximum sentence, the alternative view rejects the significance of
this fact. First, the alternative view asserts that no constitutional values are violated
when a sentence greater than that otherwise available for the offense of conviction
is imposed, so long as some statute authorizes the sentence imposed. Thus, there is
no constitutional defect in interpreting section 841 (b) as not creating new elements
of offenses in any case. Second, the critics emphasize the strict formalism of the
Apprendi principle. Even under the refined statement of the Apprendi principle,
section 841(b) could be interpreted as sentencing regulations rather than elements
of the offense if section 841(a) were amended by adding the following concluding
sentence: "A violation of this section shall be punished by up to life imprisonment,
except that no court shall impose a sentence contrary to the regulations provided in
subsection (b)." After such an amendment, the Apprendi principle would be
satisfied, yet defendants would be subject to exactly the same sentences as they
were under the pre-Apprendi interpretation of section 841. The critics of the
Apprendi principle reject the argument that this amended version of section 841
would be any different, for constitutional purposes, than the present version
increased maximum); United States v. Sheppard, 219 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting effect of Apprendi but
finding no error because indictment alleged drug amount and jury issued special verdict on drug amount).
119. See, e.g., Blue v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000); Gibson v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000); Wims
v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 32 (2000); Brown v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 295 (2000); Clinton v. United States, 121
S. Ct. 296 (2000); Hester v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 336 (2000); Jackson v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 376 (2000);
Hughes v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 423 (2000).
120. See United States v. Meshack, 225 E3d 556, 575 & n.16, 578 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Swatzie,
228 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2000).
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because, under either version, the same sentencing requirements are imposed on

drug offenders.
These contrasting views of section 841 reveal the deep differences between the
Apprendi principle and the alternative view. The Apprendi principle requires that
section 841(b) be interpreted as creating multiple offenses, opening countless
federal convictions to constitutional attack.1 2 ' The addition of a single sentence to
section 841(a), however, would appear to permit section 841(b) to be sentencing
regulations, not new offenses. In this light, it is not hard to see the appeal of the
critics' argument that the Constitution should not be interpreted to require the
formalistic Apprendi principle and its constraints on legislative drafting. Despite
intellectual disagreements about, and the important practical consequences of, the
Apprendi principle, was its adoption as a rule of constitutional criminal procedure
justified?
B. The Meaningful Formalism
Even defenders of the Apprendi principle, in its simple or refined statement,
must concede that it is a formalistic rule that, if followed in practice, places little
limitation upon legislative power. So long as the legislature properly states a single
highest possible maximum sentence in an offense-defining provision, it also may
impose its intended mandatory subsidiary sentencing gradations in expressly

121. See Masters, supra note 2; Rovella, supra note 2. A number of procedural requirements, however, will
limit significantly the number of such claims. If the Apprendi principle constitutes a "new rule" of constitutional
law (which, despite its Sixth Amendment and originalist pedigree, it almost certainly does, given the amount of
lower court precedent it invalidates), then it will be applied only to defendants whose cases are still on direct
appeal unless and until the Supreme Court makes the principle retroactively applicable via collateral attack. See
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236-38 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
Apprendi claim did not fall within second Teague exception for new fundamental rules of criminal procedure,
precluding raising of claim in first habeas petition); but see United States v. Murphy, 109 F Supp. 2d 1059,
1063-64 (D. Minn. 2000) (holding that Apprendi claim did fall within second Teague exception for new
fundamental rules of criminal procedure, permitting raising of claim in first habeas petition); see also 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2244(b)(2)(A), 2244(d)(1)(C), 2254(e)(2)(A)(i), 2255 (2000) (providing requirements for filing federal
petition for writ of habeas corpus); Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding
that second or successive habeas petition was barred because Jonesclaim not yet made retroactively applicable by
Supreme Court); Rodgers v. United States, 229 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2000) (same for Apprendi claim); Talbott v.
Indiana, 226 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Joshua, 224 F.3d 1281 (1 lth Cir. 2000). Similarly, defendants on direct
appeal who failed to raise theirApprendi claim in the trial court will have to satisfy "plain error" review, including
prejudice. See Swatzie, 228 F.3d at 1279-80; United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 227 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2000);
Grimaldo,214 F.3d at 972-75 (finding no plain error for Jones claim); United States v. Perez-Montanez, 202 F.3d
434 (1st Cit. 2000) (jury had not been instructed on death element of § 2119(3) as required by Jones, but no plain
error because no prejudice resulted). Finally, even properly preserved claims are subject to "harmless error"
analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that failure to instruct jury on
element of § 2119(3) was harmless error); United States v. Davis, 202 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding harmless
error in failure to instruct jury on element of aggravated offense in 18 U.S.C. § 1363 because relevant evidence at
trial was overwhelming); cf Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that no Jones violation
existed in state proceeding because defendant received notice in accusation, jury trial, and beyond a reasonable
doubt standard of proof for fact that increased maximum sentence).

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:281

delineated, separated, statutory or non-statutory sentencing regulations. There
ought to be a sound justification for a constitutional principle that determines that
statute A in the following example defines only one offense but that statute B
defines two.
Statute A
(a) Offense - Whoever assaults
another shall be punished by
up to five years'
imprisonment,
(b) Sentence - If at sentencing

Statute B
Whoever assaults another
shall be punished by up
to one year
imprisonment, but if
serious bodily injury

the court determines no
serious bodily injury
resulted, no sentence greater
than one year shall be
imposed.

resulted then by up to
five years' imprisonment.

That justification follows, at least in part, from the very doctrines of constitutional criminal procedure whose interaction resulted in the Supreme Court's deep
division over the Apprendi principle.
The formalistic Apprendi principle is best understood as a corollary to the
doctrines discussed in Part I. It long has been accepted that the legislature has the
power to define offenses and their constituent elements. The same is true of the
legislature's power to determine the appropriate sentence for each offense and to
enact a sentencing scheme for imposing those sentences upon convicted offenders.
Similarly, there is a longstanding distinction in the law between trial and sentencing, a distinction of considerable importance not only to the defendant but also in
the costs and burdens imposed on the prosecution, the judicial system, and society
as a whole. Thus, our constitutional doctrines presume a formal dichotomy
between the procedures under which offenses are tried and the procedures under
which sentences are imposed, yet the legislature has plenary power on both sides
of the divide. The Apprendi principle protects each of these three doctrines by
policing the formal dichotomy without policing the substance of the legislature's
power on either side of the division.
The Apprendi principle preserves the integrity of our constitutional doctrines by
requiring that the legislature respect the distinction between its offense-defining
and sentencing-regulating powers. These are separate powers over independent
and constitutionally distinct stages of the criminal justice process; therefore,
although it retains the full extent of both powers, the legislature cannot intermingle
them. The simple statement of the Apprendi principle protects the distinction by
guaranteeing the significance of the offense of conviction. When the offense of
conviction states only one maximum sentence, that maximum may not be
exceeded without obtaining another offense of conviction under the procedures for
'elements of offenses - whether a crime (e.g., additional counts) or a maximum-
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enhancing provision (e.g., a recidivism or hate crime addition). The refined
statement of the Apprendi principle further safeguards the dichotomy by declaring
a constitutional presumption of statutory construction premised upon the dichotomy itself. By definition, a sentencing-regulating provision may not increase
the sentence beyond the maximum established in the offense-defining provision.
Therefore, when a provision is in part offense-defining but states more than one
maximum sentence, the provision must be construed to be entirely offensedefining. To do otherwise would jeopardize the distinction between the legislature's offense-defining and sentencing-regulating powers, thereby undermining
the constitutionally significant difference between trial and sentencing. Similarly,
if what the legislature in fact intends to do is enact sentencing-regulating
provisions within a single maximum provided in an offense-defining statute, then
the plain statement rule within the refined Apprendi principle requires that this
intention be clearly and unambiguously apparent from the text of the provision
alone. Although this rule does not require the legislature to enact sentencing
regulations in entirely separate statutory or code sections - or, for that matter, in
non-statutory guidelines - that solution would be by far the easiest manner of
complying with the refined Apprendi principle. Thus, the Apprendi principle is a
formalistic constitutional barrier that protects another formalism - the distinction
between trial and sentencing, inherent in the central doctrines of constitutional
criminal procedure.
Viewing the Apprendi principle as a protective barrier between two legislative
powers places the principle in good constitutional company. There are many
examples in constitutional law of both principles that preserve formal distinctions
and principles that restrict the means by which the legislature may achieve a
desired end. In the former category, among others, is the Supreme Court's
precedent enforcing the principle that there is a significant distinction between the
investigatory and accusatory functions of the grand jury and the adjudicatory
function of the petit jury. On numerous occasions, the Court has held that
important rules, powers, and even constitutional rights do not apply in grand jury
proceedings. 22 This principle preserves against modem pressures an important
122. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (limiting authority of federal courts to dismiss
grand jury indictments); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (limiting right to counsel of witnesses
before grand jury); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that exclusionary rule does not apply
to use of evidence before grand jury). Although the reasoning of these cases is partly functional (considering the
differing roles of grand and petit juries), the rules adopted in their holdings are formalistic. For example, courts do
not weigh a particular witness's need for grand jury counsel or the significance of evidence in a specific grand jury
proceeding. Rather, because the proceeding is a grand jury, no right to counsel or exclusionary rule applies; if the
proceeding were a petit jury, by contrast, a court could not perform a functional analysis to deny a right to counsel
or application of the exclusionary rule-the formal requirements of a petit jury govern. Similarly, although the
reasoning of Apprendi is partly functional (protecting the role of the trial jury), its holding is a formalistic rule that
preserves only the formal offense of conviction, not functional sentencing interests of defendants. See also infra
note 133 (distinguishing between formalistic, procedural Apprendi principle and functionalistic, substantive
alternatives).
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historical and constitutional distinction. In the latter category, many of the Court's
federalism cases place no substantive limitations on the ends Congress may

achieve but rather restrict the means Congress may use when its legislation affects
the states. For example, Congress may purchase state compliance it could not
directly coerce,' 23 may enforce employment laws against states as employers
through an action brought by the United States but not by authorizing suits by
private plaintiffs, 124 or may regulate state involvement as an actor in interstate
commerce.1 25 Likewise, although a legislature ultimately may be able to regulate

or punish a type of speech or expression it disdains, it matters a great deal for
purposes of a provision's constitutionality under the First Amendment whether it is
a content-neutral. regulation of conduct that only incidentally inhibits expression or
a content- or viewpoint-based direct restriction on expression. 2 6 In a similar
manner, the formalistic Apprendi principle protects a preexisting constitutional

formalism by policing the distinction between the legislature's offense-defining
and sentencing-regulating powers without making substantive intrusions into
either of those powers when they are separately exercised.
This analysis of the Apprendi principle reveals the flaw in the attack on the
principle and the alternative view proposed by the principle's critics. The alterna-

tive view disregards the distinction between the legislature's offense-defining and
sentencing-regulating powers, a distinction that is necessary to sustain the constitutional distinction between trial and sentencing. By making the offense of
conviction irrelevant to the determination of the maximum 27 sentence and
subjecting the ultimate sentence imposed to only a fundamental fairness inquiry,
the alternative view has conflated the legislature's two powers, thereby destroying

one of the Constitution's fundamental distinctions in criminal procedure. In doing
so, the alternative view commits a basic misstep. It relies upon "a nonsequitur" by
insisting, for example, that the Apprendi principle "'simply [does] not lead us to

123. Compare South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that statute conditioning federal highway
funds on state's adoption of minimum drinking age was valid exercise of Spending Clause), with Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1995) (holding that Brady Act's background checks provision imposed unconstitutional
obligation on state officers to execute federal law), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding
that statute's "take title" provision, requiring states to accept ownership of radioactive waste or regulate according
to instructions of Congress, violated principles of federalism and Tenth Amendment).
124. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S 706 (1999); see also Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit by private individuals).
125. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141,148-50 (2000) (distinguishing Printz and New York).
126. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (discussing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (invalidating prohibition on desecration of American flag)), and United States v O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (sustaining prohibition on destruction of draft card)); compare also Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit application of Oregon drug laws to
ceremonial use of peyote), with Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(holding that ordinance prohibiting ritual slaughter of animals violated the Free Exercise Clause).
127. The Apprendi principle also applies to minimum sentences stated in offense-defining statutes. See supra
note 63 and accompanying text.
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doubt gravely that Congress may authorize courts to impose longer sentences upon
recidivists who commit a particular crime.' But no one doubts that authority - the
question in Almendarez-Torres was whether Congress had authorized those longer
sentences without the procedural protections which elements require." 128 Alternatively stated, the proper question was whether Congress had violated the distinction between offense-defining and sentencing-regulating powers. Similarly, Congress may require courts to sentence more harshly offenders who cause their
victims serious bodily injury than offenders who do not, and such increases could
vary, for example, depending on the crime committed, the severity of the injury, or
whether a weapon was used to cause the injury. Yet admitting these premises need
not destroy the distinction between offense-definition and sentencing-regulation.
The fact that an offender injured a victim during burglary of a post office would
permit a court to impose the maximum sentence available for post office burglary
(assuming statutory or non-statutory legal authority to do so on that basis), but
unless some form of maximum-enhancing provision is itself proven as an element
of the offense or as a separate offense, the five-year maximum sentence (as stated
statute) for such burglary is the greatest liability the
in the offense-defining
29
1
faces.
offender
Although the critics correctly argue that not every fact mentioned in any statute
that has an impact at sentencing must be an element of the offense, and that the
Apprendi principle should not be taken to that extreme, 130 they miss the significance of the Apprendi principle's special definition of the "prescribed statutory
maximum sentence" - that "statutory" refers only to offense-defining statutes. In
fact, one important function of the refined statement of the Apprendi principle is to
enforce the dichotomy between offense-defining and sentencing-regulating statutes. Although the rule of construction does so by requiring that maxima gradations within an offense-defining provision be construed as defining separate
offenses, the rule also works in the other direction: once a provision has been
determined to be only a sentencing-regulating provision in compliance with the
rule - that is, separately placed or meeting the plain statement requirement, and not
altering the maximum from the offense-defining statute (e.g., the federal Sentencing Guidelines) - then its relevant facts are not elements of the offense and its

128. Singer & Knoll, supra note 59, at 1107 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998)); cf also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2396 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("There is no question that New Jersey could prescribe a range of 5 to 20 years' imprisonment as
punishment for its unlawful possession offense. Thus... the specific means by which the State chooses to control
judges' discretion within that permissible range is of no moment.").
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 2115 (2000).
130. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2393-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that majority opinion actually may have been motivated by underlying principle that any sentencing
fact decided in a determinate sentencing scheme, statutory or non-statutory, must be an element); see also Priester,
supra note 6, at 284-86 (explaining defects in position that "any nonmitigating fact" affecting sentence must be
proven as element of offense).
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proof can be reserved only to the sentencing hearing. The Apprendi principle does
not restrict the legislature's offense-defining or sentencing-regulating powers, nor
does it preclude the enactment of statutory requirements under both powers, but it
does require that the two kinds of statutes be plainly distinguishable. The
alternative view, by contrast, ignores the offense of conviction and permits the
authority of any other law to regulate the sentence to be imposed on an offender.
Thus, the Apprendi principle is necessary because the distinction between trial
and sentencing - and the corresponding dichotomy between the legislature's
offense-defining and sentencing-regulating powers - is, like the right to jury trial,
central to constitutional criminal procedure and must be preserved. Without the
separation of the offense-defining and sentencing-regulating powers, the Constitution's division between trial and sentencing will be lost. Similarly, the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial guarantees not only the "low-level gatekeeping" of
the guilt-or-innocence finding but also "the significance usually carried by determinations of guilt' 3 1 - the restriction of the sentence to the limitations of, and the
entitlements created by,' 32 the statutory offense of conviction. The right to jury
trial will be lost if the jury's determination of the offense of conviction is merely
some threshold finding that has no effect on the range of punishment that may be
imposed at sentencing. 133 "What ultimately demolishes the case for the [Apprendi]
dissenters is that they are unable to say what the right to trial by jury does
guarantee if, as they assert, it does not guarantee - what it has been assumed to
guarantee throughout our history - the right to have a jury determine those facts
that determine the [offense of conviction and thus the] maximum sentence the law
34
allows. They provide no coherent alternative."t
Despite the critics' claims to the contrary, the Apprendi principle also has certain
practical values for the criminal justice system. First, in recent years, statutes of all

131. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244 (1999).
132. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
133. It is possible that Apprendi may foreshadow not only additional procedural restrictions on sentencing but
also future substantive limitations on the sentencing-regulating power itself The Apprendi principle discussed in
this Article protects against only the direct threat to the formalistic distinction between the offense-defining and
sentencing-regulating powers, and to the right to jury trial that exists when the offense of conviction is ignored at
sentencing under the alternative view. But the formalism, and the right to jury trial, also are indirectly threatened
by provisions that shift the truly significant factfinding to sentencing-as, for example, if the one-sentence,
life-imprisonment-maximum amendment to § 841(a) were made to preserve all of § 841(b) as sentencingregulating provisions. See supratext following note 118. In that situation, the jury would determine not only guilt
or innocence but also the maximum sentence (life), in compliance with the Apprendi principle. Yet this role for the
trial jury would approach "low-level gatekeeping" of "trivial" significance when compared to the impact on the
defendant of the § 841(b) factfinding at sentencing. Jones, 526 U.S. at 244. Such an indirect threat to the
formalism, and the right to jury trial, may be resolved by a further constitutional rule-e.g., requiring that any
(statutory or non-statutory) fact that has a "substantial" or "significant" impact on the defendant's sentence must
be tried to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt-but such a rule would be substantive, not procedural, and functional,
not formalistic. The Apprendi principle the Court has adopted to date, however, is much more limited in its reach,
and in its justification, than such a broader rule.
134. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2367 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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kinds have become increasingly complex and long; simplicity and clarity have
been lost. 1 35 The effect of this trend on criminal statutes has been to require a
considerable amount of statutory interpretation by the courts to understand the
offenses enacted and their scope. 136 An additional consequence has been the
erosion of the constitutional distinction between the offense-defining and sentencingregulating powers. The Apprendi principle introduces a solution to these two
problems. By requiring construction in favor of multiple offenses (absent a plain
statement of both a single maximum and sentencing-only gradations), the principle
both obviates the need for the detailed parsing of statutory text and legislative
history that often has guided statutory construction137 and protects the constitutional distinction by forcing the legislature to draft its statutes more precisely.
Second, to the extent the Apprendi principle encourages legislatures to codify, if
not enact, offense-defining and sentencing-regulating provisions separately to
avoid any constitutional difficulties under the principle, the result is beneficial to
the system. By comparison to the present necessity for intense statutory construction or the alternative view's case-by-case fundamental fairness analysis, the
Apprendi principle reduces transaction costs in the criminal justice system because
it will be clear to defendants, prosecutors, and judges which statutory provisions
define the offenses that will be considered at trial and which provisions regulate
the sentences that may be imposed upon conviction. Third, the Apprendi principle
increases the transparency of the criminal justice system. "Our rule ensures that a
State is obliged 'to make its choices concerning the substantive content of its
criminal laws with full awareness of the consequence, unable to mask substantive
policy choices' of exposing all who are convicted to the maximum sentence it
provides."'138 Although the value of the political process as a check against
excesses of the legislature in this area may be overrated, 139 that is no reason not to
require the legislature to write statutes that comply with the constitutional division
between offense-defining and sentencing-regulating powers. Fourth and finally,
none of the pragmatic concerns about the desirability of sentencing reform and
legislative power to enact it 140 would be undermined by the Apprendi principle
because the legislature's plenary power to control sentencing is preserved; if the

135. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (2000), with id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title VH"), 12101-12213
("ADA"); also compare 18 U.S.C. § 241, 242 (2000), with id. §§ 922,924, and 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 139 F.3d 822, 826-38 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that third sentence in text
of 21 U.S.C. § 844 creates separate offense from first two sentences of text); see also, e.g., Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227, 232-39 (1999); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228-39 (1998).
137. See supra note 136.
138. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2363 n.16 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 228-29 & n.13 (1977)
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
139. Compare Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2363 n.16 (describing "structural democratic constraints" on high
maxima for simple crimes), with id. at 2390-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that because legislature can
achieve same result through Sentencing Guidelines, the political constraints would be ineffective because they are
practical, not formalistic).
140. See, e.g., id. at 2396-2402 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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legislature disagrees with the construction of a statute required by the refined

statement of the principle, a properly drafted statute clearly separating the
sentencing regulations from the offense elements will restore the legislature's
intent.141 The principle only requires the legislature to obey the constitutional
separation between the offense-defining and sentencing-regulating powers by

plainly stating which power it is exercising in each statute.
The Apprendi principle is an important addition to the Supreme Court's
doctrines of constitutional criminal procedure, The principle serves as a protective
barrier between the legislature's separate powers to define offenses and regulate
sentences. Although the legislature may avoid this formalistic constitutional rule

by properly and plainly drafting offense-defining provisions and sentencingregulating provisions, that does not deprive the Apprendi principle of meaning or
value. The long-standing constitutional distinctions between trial and sentencing,
and between the offense-defining and sentencing-regulating powers, are themselves formalistic. Preserving those fundamental constitutional distinctions provides all the meaning and value the Apprendi principle needs.

141. There was some suggestion in Apprendi that the enactment of a statute with a high maximum sentence to
avoid the Apprendi principle's interpretive requirements might itself be unconstitutional. 120 S. Ct. at 2363 n. 16;
id. at 2378-80 (Thomas, J., concurring). Given the formalistic basis of the Apprendi principle, such actions could
just as easily be seen as compliance with the principle rather than "evasion" of it. The more persuasive and
stronger source for limits on such actions would come not from the Apprendi principle or preventing its evasion,
but from substantive constitutional doctrines, such as a more vigorous Eighth Amendment proportionality
requirement. See supra note 133; Priester, supra note 6, at 291 n.2 10; cf also Note,Awaiting the Mikado: Limiting
Legislative Discretion to Define CriminalElements and Sentencing Factors, tt2 HARV. L. REV. 1349, 1361-66
(1999) (arguing that judicial review of sentencing provisions generally should be limited to preventing
maximum-sentence enhancements and overall disproportionality).

